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Introduction
In the era of climate change, firms are exerted increasing pressure to reduce carbon emissions while maintain their economic competitiveness. However, the notion of "boundaryless responsibility" (Amaeshi et al. 2008 ) means that firms need to consider how they can achieve economic, environmental, and social objectives of the sustainability throughout their entire supply chain. It is important for them to look beyond their organizational boundaries and develop a more holistic solution for a sustainable supply chain. Sustainable supply chain management would require efforts from all segments of the supply chain. However, there are often conflicting interests between individual supply chain members such as tension between a manufacturer and a retailer considered in this study. In the UK and France, we have witnessed some high profile protests against major supermarket chains by the dairy farmers because of cheap prices of milk. Despite Apple's promise, published in annual Supplier Responsibility Report to improve working conditions and preserve the environment, some of the technology giant's suppliers are on the news headlines being accused over worker exploitation. Moreover, the UK government requires firms to measure and to report their annual greenhouse gas emissions of their own operations, and furthermore, it is also anticipated that companies will be required to report carbon footprint of upstream supply chain activities that are beyond a reporting firm's direct control.
Sustainable supply chain management requires a coordinated effort from all parties to achieve the sustainability objectives. Such an effort may be hampered by the trade-offs between different sustainability objectives and tensions between supply chain members.
Furthermore, the power relationship between supply chain partners makes the coordination of a sustainable supply chain even more complicated. Referring to resource-dependence perspective, power depends on the criticality of the commercial and operational resources and the availability of alternatives for souring the same resource (Cox et al., 2002; Touboulic et al. 2014) . Touboulic et al. (2014) shows the influences of power on how supply chain members manage their relationships and its effect of organizational response to the sustainability implementation. It is critical that power structures that exist in the supply chains are properly understood by managers in order to manage supply chains strategically and operationally (Cox 1999 ). Very little effort has been made in the existing literature to explore the issue of coordinating the sustainable supply chain with the consideration of power relationship. This study is going to fill this gap in the literature by addressing the following research questions:
(1) Should the supply chain members work on sustainability initiatives independently or coordinate their sustainability effort? (2) If yes, how should members coordinate with each other to achieve economic and environmental competitiveness? (3) What is the impact of supply chain power relationship on the coordination decisions and sustainability performances?
In order to answer these questions, a two-echelon supply chain is considered. It consists of a manufacturer and a retailer who purchases products from the manufacturer and sell them to end consumers. To take economic and environmental performances into consideration, the consumer demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be carbon emissions sensitive, as well as price sensitive. Based on game models, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer's optimal retail price are derived under three different . Nevertheless, few studies have been brought the two important issues together to systematically examine their impact on accomplishing the economic and environmental competitiveness. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore this research avenue. The research findings derived from such an investigation will help firms seek optimal solutions based on their supply chain environments to improve the sustainability performances.
Second, more and more firms view the carbon emission reduction as a competitive strategy to win customer demand because of the increasing customer environmental consciousness (Liu et al. 2012; Kanchanapibul et al. 2014; Zhang 2015) . We consider a demand function that is both price and carbon emissions sensitive and use the carbon emission attribute as a decision variable rather than a constraint, which complements to the existing low carbon supply chain literature that often uses the carbon emissions attribute as a constraint or considers the demand of single manufacturer (Nouira et al. 2014; Du et al. 2015 ).
Third, this research also makes important practical and policy contributions. Through the systematic analysis of optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, unit carbon emissions, and tariff contracts under different supply chain power structures, our findings provide valuable managerial implications, which will be beneficial for firms to make important strategic and operational decisions in order to achieve economic and environmental competitiveness.
Furthermore, from the policy makers' perspective, our research findings provide interesting insights on how different supply chain power relationships affect firms' decision and, as a result, the economic and environmental performances of the entire supply chain. It is valuable for policy makers to create a more sustainable supply chain environment that can promote low carbon economy.
The remaining of this article is organised as follows. After a brief review of research background in Section 2, we present model assumptions and descriptions in Section 3. In Section 4, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer's optimal retail price are obtained in the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the vertical Nash (VN) model, and the retailer Stackelberg (RS) model respectively. In Section 5, we focus on how to achieve channel coordination through a two-part tariff contract for the sustainable supply chain. In Section 6, we examine the effect of power relationship on the coordination decisions and sustainability performances of the supply chain. A case study is presented in Section 7, in which numerical examples are provided to give more management insights. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications of our study and possible future 5 work in Section 8.
Research Background
The literature reviewed in this article primarily relates to three research streams: (i) sustainable supply chain management, (ii) coordination in sustainable supply chain management, and (iii) the role of power in sustainable supply chain management.
Sustainable supply chain management: an overview
Sustainable development is defined as 'a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED 1987) . The concept of sustainability requires that a mix of social, economic and environmental factors should be incorporated into decisions on business development and resource allocation (Dyllick and 
Coordinating sustainable supply chains
Channel coordination is an important issue in supply chain management. According to Jeuland and Shugan (1983) , channel coordination is defined as the setting of all manufacturer and retailer related decisions at the levels that would maximize the total channel profits. Although game theoretical approaches have been widely adopted to examine the effect of the supply chain power structure on firms' operations decisions and their performances, as far as our understanding, few studies have systematically analysed the impact of power relationship on the coordination of sustainable supply chains and the sustainability performance. Our paper complements the exiting literature by specifically providing analytical models to study power relationship and channel coordination in a sustainable supply chain environment. It will help develop a better understanding of the role of the supply chain power relationship in achieving sustainability goals.
Model descriptions and assumption
We consider a two-echelon supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer.
The retailer purchases products from the manufacturer and sells them to the end customers.
The demand faced by the retailer is price and carbon emissions sensitive, and the decision variable of the retailer is retail price. The decision variables faced by the manufacturer are wholesale price and unit carbon emissions after green technology investment. Throughout this paper, we use the notations presented in Table 1 .
Table 1: Notations Notation Descriptions
Manufacturer's unit production cost.
Manufacturer's unit wholesale price. Base on the above assumptions, the manufacturer's profit is
The first term is the revenue from product wholesale, the second term indicates the production cost, and the third term refers to the green technology investment. That is
We assume that the retailer's unit marginal profit is , then = − . So
Similarly, the retailer's profit is
The first term is the revenue from product retail sales, and the second term represents the purchase cost. That is,
4 Different power structure models
In this section, we discuss the models with three different supply chain power structures, which are the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the vertical Nash (VN) model, and the retailer Stackelberg (RS) model respectively.
I. The Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model
In the case of a MS power structure, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions in sequence. The order of events is as follows. First, the retailer determines the retail price in response to the given manufacturer's wholesale price and unit carbon emissions. Then, the manufacturer takes the retailer's response function into account for the optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions in order to maximize profit. Finally, when the customer demand is realized, the manufacturer and the retailer gain their revenues.
Ⅱ. The Vertical Nash (VN) model
In the case of a VN power structure, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions simultaneously. The order of events is as follows. The manufacturer determines the response function of wholesale price and unit carbon emissions to maximize profit given the retailer's retail price, and the retailer determines the response function of retailer price to maximize profit given the manufacturer's wholesale price and unit carbon emissions. Finally, when the customer demand is realized, the manufacturer and the retailer gain their revenues.
Ⅲ. The Retailer Stackelberg (RS) model
In the case of a RS power structure, the retailer and the manufacturer make their decisions in the following order. First, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and unit carbon emissions in response to the given retailer's retail price. Then, the retailer takes the manufacturer's response function into account for the optimal retail price to maximize profit.
Finally, when the customer demand is realized, the manufacturer and the retailer gain their revenues.
Regarding the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price ( ) and unit carbon emissions ( ), and the retailer's optimal retail price ( ) in different power structures ( = , , ), the following lemma is obtained:
The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price ( ) and unit carbon emissions ( ), and the retailer's optimal retail price ( ) in three different power structures are summarized in Table 2 .
This lemma means that the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer's optimal retail price are in existent and unique in the MS, VN and RS power structures. 
Regarding the effect of the manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) on the optimal decisions for both the manufacturer and the retailer, the following corollary can be obtained: This corollary means that in each supply chain power structure, when the manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) is high, that is, the manufacturer's green technology investment efficiency is low, then the manufacturer will invest less on green technology. As a result, the manufacturer's optimal unit carbon emissions after green technology investment ( ) are high, which lead to less customer demand. In order to attract more customers, the retailer has to reduce the unit retail price ( ). At the same time, since manufacturer's green technology investment is less, the manufacturer will set a low optimal wholesale price ( ), = , , .
Supply chain coordination
In this section, an integrated supply chain is discussed as a benchmark. The firm's profit, denoted as ( , ), is
The first term is the firm's revenue from product sales, and the second term represents the green investment. As to the firm's optimal retail price ( ) and optimal unit carbon emissions ( ) in an integrated supply chain, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 2
In an integrated supply chain,
This lemma means that in an integrated supply chain, there are unique optimal retail price and optimal unit carbon emissions.
Now we discuss the supply chain coordination. Beside the wholesale price , we assume that the retailer makes a lump-sum payment to the manufacturer, and we call this mixed contract as two-part tariff contract. Under the two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer's profit, denoted as ( , ), is
Under the two-part tariff contract, the retailer's profit, denoted as ( , ), is
Regarding the supply chain coordination with the two-part tariff contract, the following proposition is obtained. This proposition indicates that a two-part tariff contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the Pareto improvement, that is, both the manufacturer and the retailer can gain more profit than that without the two-part tariff contract. Under this contract, the manufacturer undertakes the green technology investment and gains no profit from the product sales, but gains revenue from the lump-sum payment paid by the retailer. The amount of the lump-sum payment paid by the retailer is affected by the supply chain power structure.
At the same time, the retailer obtains profit from the product sales and makes a lump-sum payment to the manufacturer to compensate the manufacturer's green technology investment.
carbon emissions, profits and the retailer's lump-sum payment.
Regarding the effect of power structure on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer's optimal retail price, the following proposition is obtained:
This proposition indicates that the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price in a MS power structure is higher than that in a VN power structure. Its optimal wholesale price is the lowest in a RS power structure. That is, the more supply chain power that the manufacturer has, the higher wholesale price will be set. This means that a dominant manufacturer is more likely to exercise its supply chain power to gain economic benefit rather than to invest on green technologies to improve its efficiencies in production and carbon emissions reduction.
However, in order to achieve the sustainability objectives, fundamentally, we need firms to improve their energy efficiency and decrease their unit carbon emissions through green technology investment. Therefore, the short term economic gains from exercising supply chain power may not be sustainable over the long term as their competitors can improve their operation efficiencies and enhance their competitive capabilities, and as result, change the power relationship of the supply chain.
In addition, both the manufacturer's optimal unit carbon emissions and the retailer's optimal retail price is the lowest in a VN power structure and is the highest in a MS power structure. That is, the VN power structure will benefit both the environment and the customer, and in contrast, the MS power structure will hurt both the environment and the customer. This can be explained by the fact that a balanced supply chain power relationship provides a more competitive and fair supply chain environment. An enhanced but fairer competition will drive the supply chain parties to be more innovative and carbon efficient in making products and delivering customer services. This will certainly require the manufacturer and the retailer to invest more on technologies to improve their operational and carbon emission reduction capabilities. Such efforts will lead to improved economic and environmental performances of the individual members and the supply chain as a whole, and therefore make the supply chain more sustainable.
Regarding the effect of the supply chain power structure on the maximum profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the whole supply chain, the following proposition is obtained:
From this proposition, we know that the manufacturer will gain more profit in a MS power structure and will generate less profit in a RS power structure. In contrast, the retailer will gain more profit in a RS power structure and generate less profit in a MS power structure.
That means, the more supply chain power, the more profit that the manufacturer or the retailer is able to set a more favourable wholesale price or retail price for its own benefit. For the whole supply chain, a more balanced power relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer will lead to higher profit. Recalling the proposition 2, we found that the VN power structure will benefit the environment, the end consumers and the whole supply chain.
Regarding the effect of power structure on the retailer's lump-sum payment ( ), the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 4 > > .
From this proposition, we know that the supply chain power relationship plays an important role in the retailer's lump-sum payment. If it is a MS power structure, a higher lump-sum payment will be paid to the manufacturer. In contrast, if it is a RS power structure, a lower lump-sum payment will be paid to the manufacturer. Again, similar to the explanation made earlier, more supply chain power will give the manufacturer or the retailer an advantage when negotiating the lump-sum payment with their supply chain count parties.
Case study
A case study of the food supply chain is presented here to illustrate how our analytical modelling results can be applied to the supply chains in the real world. Food provision is an essential part of our society. Whereas the production and distribution of food products become more efficient in many aspects, managing the sustainability of the food supply chain remains to be urgent than ever as the industry consumes a large amount of natural resources and faces ever increasing demand ). In addition, food supply chains are often key contributors of greenhouse gas emissions. For instance, in the UK, the food industry contributes about 40% of the national total emissions (Government Office for Science, 2011).
Therefore, it is critical for food supply chains to improve the sustainability in order to regain and retain consumer trust and meet the future demand.
Furthermore, all three supply chain power relationships discussed in this research are common in the food supply chain. For instance, in many developed countries, consumers purchase their food products from grocery supermarkets. In fact, supermarkets are often the dominant force or supply chain leader (the retailer Stackelberg game). They are often described as the chain captain, who has the power to impose through strategic and operational decisions and drive the sustainability agenda. In the grocery food supply chain, there are also powerful and resourceful multinational food manufacturers e.g. Nestle and Danone. Therefore, there is often a balanced supply chain power relationship (the vertical Nash game) between the big food manufacturers and supermarkets. In addition, there is a different supply chain power relationship (the manufacturer Stackelberg game) when the powerful food manufacturers sell their products through smaller scale independent food retailers, which is also common in both developed and developing countries. In the United Kingdom, the grocery supply chain has received much attention from the general public and policy makers on its sustainability performance due to some recent high profile events such as the Horse Meat Scandal and the price dispute between diary producers and supermarket chains. While the imbalanced supply chain power relationship may contribute these incidents, the price dispute between TESCO (the UK largest supermarket) and Unilever (the largest food manufacturer) has again attracted wide media coverage.
In the following section, numerical analysis is provided to examine the impact of various factors on firms' operations decisions and economic and environmental performances. More specifically, we discuss the effect of manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) and carbon emissions sensitivity ( ) on maximum profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. There are hundreds types of food products involved in the daily transition in the grocery food supply chain. For the demonstration purpose, we only choose one product item in the illustrative example, in which, we specify that the food manufacturer's unit production cost ( ) for this item as £1, the manufacturer's initial unit carbon emissions ( 0 ) as 20, the maximal market demand ( ) as 100, and the price sensitivity ( ) as 3.
Effects of manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( )
First, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the effects of manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) on the maximum profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. We assume that the carbon emissions sensitivity ( ) is 1. However, we will also analyse the effect of carbon emissions sensitivity with a different set of value for in the next section. The corresponding results are shown in Figure 1 .
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Effects of on firms' economic performance
From Figure 1 , we observe that manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) does affect the maximum profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer in each power structure. As the manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) increases, the manufacturer has to invest more to achieve the carbon emissions reduction.
Then the manufacturer's maximum profit decreases in each power structure. At the same time, in order to reduce the burden of green technology investment cost, the manufacturer wants to share the green technology investment cost with the retailer by adjusting the wholesale price, Profit(£) Profit (£)
then the retailer's maximum profit will also decrease. So, when the manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) increases, both the manufacturer's maximum profit ( Figure 1a ) and the retailer's maximum profit (Figure 1b ) decrease in all three power structures. The above analysis indicates that in order to achieve the financial benefit (e.g. making more profit), supply chain members should try to gain more market power through increasing the economic scale of their businesses, and alternatively improve the efficiency of green technology investment through developing their technological and operational capabilities.
Effects of carbon emissions sensitivity ( )
Now, we examine the effect of carbon emissions sensitivity ( ) on the manufacturer's maximum profits and total carbon emissions ( , = , , ). We specify that the manufacturer's green technology investment cost coefficient ( ) as 0. Profit (£) 
Series1 Series2 Series3
Total carbon emissions manufacturer's total carbon emissions in each power structure. As the carbon emissions sensitivity ( ) increases, that is, the customers demand is more sensitive on the carbon emissions sensitivity ( ), it will force firms to reduce carbon emissions in order to win customer orders. However, it requires more investment on green technology. Therefore, it is clear from Figure 2 that more sensitive customer demand toward carbon emission will, on the one hand, improve firms' environmental performance, and on the other hand, decrease their economic performance because of the additional cost involved in carbon emissions reduction.
Firms have to deal with the dilemma between the economic and environmental objectives of the sustainability. As the evolving public attitude towards the environmental protection, in order to improve their long term competitive capabilities, it will be beneficial for firms to sacrifice the short term economic performance and reduce their carbon emissions through green technology investment. In this connection, the Government may be able to introduce relevant policy to subsidise or to help the industry, especially small and medium sized companies, to overcome this short term pain.
Conclusion and future research
Sustainability agenda has become increasingly important in ensuring sound business practices in everyday life. In this paper, a two-echelon sustainable supply chain is considered consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Based on game models, we derive the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer's optimal retail price under three supply chain power structures. In addition, we design a two-part tariff contract that takes into account the relevant parameters of prices and green technology investment. Our analysis show that such a contract can coordinate the sustainable supply chain under different power structures and achieve the Pareto improvement. Finally, we discuss the effect of power relationship on the supply chain's decisions, coordination contracts, and sustainability performances. The main findings are as following:
Economically, the more power a retailer or a manufacturer has over its supply chain partner, the more economic benefit can be gained for the powerful supply chain member. The increased profit is mainly contributed by a higher retail price or wholesale price they can charge to their customers or a higher lump-sum payment received from its supply chain partner. From the whole supply chain point of view, a more balanced power between the manufacturer and the retailer, i.e., the VN model in this study, will generate the best economic performance. Interestingly, there is a dilemma between maximizing individual firms' profits and the whole supply chain's profits. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the business competition have already evolved from the competition of individual companies to the competition of supply chains. In order to achieve an economically sustainable supply chain, even for solely profit pursuers, it is essential to improve the economic performance of the whole supply chain to ensure a long term success.
Environmentally, the VN model also produces the best performance as it generates the lowest optimal unit carbon emissions. In contrast, the MS model produces the worst environmental performance as it generates the highest optimal unit carbon emissions. This can be explained by the fact that in the Manufacturer or Retailer Stackelberg models, the manufacturer or the retailer often exploits her power over her dependent supply chain members to gain economic benefit rather than improve their own operations efficiency or environmental capabilities to gain market competitiveness. In contrast, there is more supply chain competition in the VN model, which drives the manufacturer and the retailer to invest on technologies to improve their operations and environmental capabilities in order to gain market competitiveness.
Socially, a balanced supply chain relationship performs best as compared to the Stackelberg models. This is mainly reflected in two aspects. First, from the general public perspective, while generating the lowest optimal unit carbon emissions, the VN model also achieves the lowest optimal retail price. It means that if there is a balanced supply chain power, the environmentally friendly products are more affordable to the end consumers and therefore can be accessed and consumed by a wider population. Second, from the whole supply chain point of view, a balanced power also generates more profits as compared to the power imbalanced supply chains. Supply chain partners can therefore share the increased profits between them through a two-part tariff contract and gain mutual benefits.
Consequently, they can either pay bonuses or dividends to existing staff to improve the welfare of existing staff or re-invest gained profit to recruit new staff.
Our findings provide many interesting managerial and policy implications. First, we derived the optimal wholesale price, retail price, unit carbon emissions and lump-sum payment under three different supply chain power structures, which will be beneficial to manufacturers and retailers in different supply chain environments to make optimal operational decisions to improve their profits. Second, we discuss the implications of the supply chain power relationship to the sustainability performances from the perspectives of economics, environment and society, which enables manufacturers and retailers to make strategic decisions toward sustainable supply chain management. , using deterministic models does not consider the cost associated with demand uncertainty. One future extension is to investigate the research problem using other forms of demand function including stochastic models to explore how different demand functions might influence the result. Furthermore, although social implications of a sustainable supply chain are discussed from the view of consumer affordability of low carbon emissions product and the mutual benefits of supply chain parties, we have to acknowledge that the social aspect of the sustainability is not specifically quantified as compared to the economic and environmental aspects. It will be an interesting future research extension to incorporate the key indicator that specifically measures the social performance in the analytical model. Finally, our model assumed the two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer. In the real world, supply chains are often much more complicated than this simple form of supply chain structure.
Despite the value and contribution discussed above, the research would generate more interesting insights and provide better decisions support if other supply chain parties such as consumers and logistics service providers can be incorporated in the modelling. It would also be interesting to consider multi-retailers and/or multi-manufacturers and analyse the effect of vertical and horizontal power relationships on supply chain decisions and sustainability performances.
perspective. 
Proof of Lemma 2
From (4), we get ( , ) = − 2 + − , ( , ) = 2( 0 − ) − ( − ) . From 
Proof of Proposition 1
From (6), we get ( ) = − 2 + − and 
